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Patent application numbers grow exponentially in many industries, a phenomenon that has 
been linked to high fragmentation of patent ownership. Contradicting these findings and 
theoretical arguments, we show that such fragmentation is not a precondition for sudden 
and strong increases in patenting. We describe and analyze a patent portfolio race in an 
industry with highly concentrated patent ownership, namely the newspaper printing 
machines oligopoly. Triangulating data from patent analysis, interviews, and document 
research, we find that patent strategy change by one player triggered a patent portfolio 
race with its main competitor. Implications for managers are that increasing patent output 
may yield temporary advantages but, as in a price war, implies the risk of a prisoner’s 
dilemma-type outcome with potentially severe implications for effectiveness and efficiency 
of the innovation process. 
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1  Introduction 
Recent economic research has identified high fragmentation of patent ownership as the 
major driver of patent portfolio races among industrial firms, leading to (possibly ineffi-
ciently) high patenting rates in certain industries (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Zie-
donis, 2001; Heller, 2008; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Scotchmer, 1991; Ziedonis 2004). In 
this paper we show that even under very low fragmentation of patent rights dramatic patent 
portfolio races occur. We study the industry of newspaper printing machines, which has seen 
a more than three-fold increase in the number of patent applications within less than five years 
(while research and development [R&D] headcount hardly changed), although relevant pat-
ents are held by only four major firms. 
Based on transaction cost theory, scholars have argued that high fragmentation of patent 
ownership, with possibly thousands of potential patentees, decreases the odds of identifying 
ex ante the holders of patents relevant to the design and manufacturing of a focal firm (Hall 
and Ziedonis; 2001, Williamson, 1985; Ziedonis, 2004). Thus, it increases the risk that patent 
infringement by the focal firm will be identified only after the firm has made significant in-
vestments in the infringing technology and invent around is inadequately costly. Furthermore, 
ex ante coordination is harder to establish and to sustain the more players that are involved. 
Literature predicts that firms faced with high fragmentation of intellectual property (IP frag-
mentation) will amass defensive patents in order to mitigate the risk of rent expropriation in 
case of holdup—the rationale being the ability to countersue a potential attacker (Cohen et al., 
2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis 2004). This behavior ultimately spawns patent port-
folio races that might lead to a prisoner’s dilemma-type outcome (Cohen et al., 2000).  2 
Empirical findings on such excessive patenting stem from dynamic
1 high-tech industries 
that face highly fragmented markets for technology, such as semiconductors, electronics, and 
software (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001; Noel and Schankerman, 2006; Ziedonis, 2004). Based on this literature, one would rea-
sonably assume that if IP fragmentation was the main driver of excessive patenting, less dy-
namic and more consolidated industries with highly concentrated patent ownership devise ex 
ante solutions to the potential holdup problems, and thus are able to avoid inefficient patent 
portfolio races. 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence from a contrasting scenario. We study a 
highly consolidated, stable market—the newspaper printing machines industry. It consists of 
four major players, and product life cycles range between 10 and 20 years. With only four 
major players and the specificity of their products, the fragmentation of intellectual property 
right holders relevant to this market is very low. Thus, it should be possible for the firms in 
this market to identify the owners of important and potentially dangerous patents. This fact, in 
turn, should render ex ante contracting more feasible, decrease holdup risk, and inhibit portfo-
lio races. Nonetheless, this industry has seen a more than three-fold increase in the number of 
patent applications within less than five years, even an almost quadruple increase for one 
firm, while R&D headcount hardly changed. 
This observation shows that the potential of firms in the machinery sector to effectuate ad 
hoc increases of their patent portfolios without related increases in R&D inputs is tremendous. 
More importantly, it shows that even in the absence of IP fragmentation sudden, explosive 
increases in patenting activity can occur. 
                                                 
1  Industry dynamicity aggravates the problem of ex ante coordination. A patent spends 18 months at the patent 
office before it is published. During this period, other firms are ignorant of the application. This fact poses 
problems in particular if the respective industry has developed very fast during these 18 months, since firms do 
not even know who the relevant future rights holders will be. 3 
We identify the perceived ineffectiveness of single patents as the main motive of the first 
mover to change its strategy and file more patents per invention. The larger patent portfolio of 
its most important competitor, in turn, prompted the second player to follow suit and increase 
its patenting. A patent portfolio race, or “arms race” ensued.
2 To make our point, we rule out 
alternative explanations of the explosive increase in patenting. Furthermore, our results show 
that the problem of patent arms races is not limited to the United States. Even in Europe, 
where arms races were considered less likely due to higher standards of patentability (Hall et 
al., 2004), dramatic races occur. 
Our results contribute further insights into the effects of industry and IP fragmentation on 
patenting. Whereas IP fragmentation may really drive a focal firm’s patenting in the semicon-
ductor industry, low IP fragmentation apparently does not prevent patent portfolio races in the 
machinery sector. Moreover, if low IP fragmentation did reduce the patent arms race risk, this 
reduction seems to be outweighed by other factors, such as perceived ineffectiveness of single 
patents and close competition in a specific product market. This finding adds to the knowl-
edge of determinates of patenting behavior by showing that high IP fragmentation is not the 
only—and not even a necessary—driver of a patent arms race. 
Drawing on game-theoretical arguments about repeated interaction, in particular the folk 
theorem (e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 245), we argue that increasing patent output may yield tempo-
rary advantages but, as in a price war, implies the risk of a prisoner’s dilemma-type outcome. 
The combatants are worse off in the new equilibrium than before, since more resources have 
to be devoted to filing, managing, monitoring, enforcing, inventing around, and invalidating 
patents as well as to resolving patent disputes. As a result, their innovation processes are 
                                                 
2  Note that a “patent arms race” is different from a “patent race”. In a patent arms race, firms compete for the 
largest patent portfolio. In a patent race, firms compete in a race to be first to achieve a specific invention and 
to obtain a patent on it (cf. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Loury, 1979; Reinganum, 1982). 4 
likely to become less efficient, and possibly even less effective if engineers work on patents 
instead of inventions.  
In our conclusion, we discuss potential solutions to the arms race. Due to the low number 
of incumbents, patent pools (which are common in e.g. the electronics industry) would be 
subject to antitrust considerations. Rather, other coordination mechanisms, in particular tacit 
collusion, are likely to evolve. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses extant literature 
on firms’ motives to increase patenting; Section 3 describes data collection and analysis; Sec-
tion 4 presents results from patent data analysis, interviews, and document research; and Sec-
tions 5 and 6 conclude. 
2  Background 
2.1. Patenting and the fragmentation of intellectual property rights: Industry context 
Pioneers in patent research have discussed whether the numbers of patent applications and 
grants are appropriate measures of inventive output (Pakes and Griliches 1980). Since schol-
ars have begun to study propensity to patent (Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Scherer, 1983), evi-
dence has grown that the surge in patenting observable in certain industries is largely due to 
increased propensity to patent rather than to increased inventive output (Hall, 2005; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Kim and Marschke, 2004). Patent portfolio races contribute to this increase. 
Extant literature links patent portfolio races to a high level of IP fragmentation. The con-
tribution of our study is to juxtapose this situation to an antipodal industry setting character-
ized by very low IP fragmentation, and to analyze why the latter, contrary to accepted wis-
dom, has similarly yielded a patent portfolio race. In the following, we discuss both industry 
settings with respect to incentives for patenting and for patent races in particular. 5 
2.1.1.  Fragmented markets for technology 
Highly fragmented markets for technology are present in the semiconductor, electronics, 
and software industries, among others. In the semiconductor industry, for example, potential 
rights holders range from pure design firms to integrated manufacturers (Arora et al., 2001, p. 
76; Macher et al., 1999; Ziedonis, 2003). Peter N. Detkin of Intel Corporation in his testimony 
before the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in 2002 estimates that the approximately 90,000 
existing patents for central processing units are held by more than 10,000 parties.
3 For the 
communication electronics industry, Gilroy and D’Amato (2009) estimate that over 2,700 
separate entities were actively patenting technology relevant to the fourth generation of cellu-
lar wireless networks and devices in 2008. 
In such a situation firms face high holdup risk, and are likely to increase patenting in order 
to forearm against infringement suits. The increase is defensive and motivated by the goal to 
mitigate risks of expropriation. The rationale of this strategy is the ability to countersue poten-
tial plaintiffs, at least those that are practicing entities themselves (in contrast to “nonpractic-
ing entities”, or “patent trolls”, see e.g. Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Reitzig et al., 2007).  
There is broad empirical evidence of patent portfolio races in fragmented markets for 
technology. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) analyze the doubling of patent output per R&D dollar 
for a sample of 95 publicly traded semiconductor firms over a period of 10 years. They find 
that firms entered patent portfolio races in order to forearm against holdup by competitors that 
owned patents required for the firms’ own production. Ziedonis (2004), analyzing 67 semi-
conductor firms, concludes that a wide distribution of patent rights will lead to more aggres-
sive patenting by capital intensive firms. This hypothesis is based on the reasoning that a high 
fragmentation of markets for technology makes ex ante licensing or acquisition of patent 
                                                 
3  Peter N. Detkin, vice president, Legal and Government Affairs and assistant general counsel, Intel Corpora-
tion, 18 February 2002, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228peterndetkin.pdf (accessed 18 May 2010). 6 
holders less feasible and thus increases holdup risk. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009), based 
on an analysis of 27 distinct software product markets between 1980 and 2006, find evidence 
that firms without patents are less likely to go public if they operate in a market characterized 
by overlapping intellectual property rights (so called “patent thickets” [Shapiro, 2001]). This 
creates an incentive for firms owning fewer patents in “thicket-markets” to increase their pat-
ent portfolios in order to improve their chances of going public. Noel and Schankerman 
(2006), using panel data on software firms in the United States during 1980 to 1999, find that 
higher concentration of patent rights is associated with lower patenting activity. 
2.1.2.  Concentrated markets for technology 
In a concentrated technology market, holdup risk due to patent infringement is lower than 
in a fragmented market since firms do not have to fear litigation by previously unknown pat-
ent holders. In line with Noel and Schankerman (2006), one would thus expect that, with low 
IP fragmentation, the mitigation of holdup risk is less important as a motive for excessive 
patenting. Rather, we would assume a course of action comparable to a price war: A first 
mover increases its patenting for some reason—to be analyzed below—and followers respond 
swiftly and in a way that is clearly directed at the first mover. This is because there are few 
firms against which the first mover could use its additional patents, be it for blocking or for 
extracting royalties, and so industry participants are strongly dependent on the behavior of 
rivals (Porter 1980: 91) and very likely to react. Also, due to the small number of relevant 
patent holders, visibility of competitors’ patent applications is high. 
Note that this scenario does not preclude patent infringement. Yet, in contrast to a situa-
tion characterized by high IP fragmentation, the alleged infringer will most likely have known 
the plaintiff before. Once involved in costly litigation, forced to pay license fees, or even to 
shut down a plant, a firm will, in a similar fashion as in a highly fragmented market, increase 
patenting in order to forearm against future attacks (Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Lanjouw and 7 
Lerner 2001, von Hippel 1988: 53). Once such a “patent war” (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe,  
2007, p. 81) or patent arms race has been started, it is very likely that mutually blocking posi-
tions will result. Firms may use cross-licenses to resolve such situations (Shapiro, 2001), or to 
avoid them in the first place. However, if balancing payments are negotiated on the basis of a 
comparison of patent counts, cross-licensing creates an incentive to further increase the num-
ber of patents rather than to improve the quality of the underlying inventions. An industry that 
fits this scenario to a high degree is the newspaper printing oligopoly. 
2.2. First mover motives and triggers of an increase in patenting per R&D 
The behavior of a follower in a patent arms race is triggered by that of the first mover. It is 
less obvious, though, what drives the first mover to deviate from hitherto stable patenting 
rates in its industry. Our review of the literature reveals a variety of potential drivers: the inte-
gration of IP management in corporate strategy, perceived ineffectiveness of individual pat-
ents, the threat of market entry, increased use of patents for retaliation and bargaining, loss of 
patents due to oppositions,
4 the aim to increase royalty income, a higher need to signal inno-
vativeness, and changes in patenting standards.  
If a firm’s IP management becomes an explicit element of its corporate strategy (Adler et 
al., 1992, p. 27; Reitzig, 2007), we would expect that more sophisticated patent strategies 
would result, often involving increased filing numbers. Such attention to IP on the strategic 
level will, in turn, be caused by one of the drivers discussed in the following.  
In many industries, patents are perceived as relatively ineffective in enabling firms to 
profit from their innovations (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mans-
field, 1986; Sattler, 2003). Among other things, this is because single patents can be invented 
around relatively easily in many technology fields (Cohen et al., 2000). A way to increase 
                                                 
4  At the European Patent Office as well as the German Patent and Trademark Office, third parties may file an 
opposition against a granted patent within nine months after the grant.  8 
effectiveness of patent protection is to build patent “fences” (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 
2007, p. 87; Reitzig, 2004b). To this end, a firm would not only patent the initial invention, 
but would also start patenting variations of it; for example, different geometric shapes or tem-
perature conditions (Granstrand, 1999, p. 220). These patents, and even pending applications, 
then form fences to impede invent around, to block competitors, and to prevent rivals from 
patenting related inventions (Arundel and Patel, 2003; Blind et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Granstrand, 1999; Henkel and Jell, 2009; Kash and Kingston 2001). 
Market entry or even the threat of it might be a further trigger for firms to increase patent-
ing. In the absence of or in addition to alternative mechanisms such as complementary assets 
or complexity of design (Teece, 1986), firms might use patents to protect against new en-
trants, in which case patents effectively function as market entry barriers (Bain, 1956; Caves, 
1974; Caves et al., 1991; Porter, 1980). Diversification strategies might provoke the same 
reaction and trigger the use of patents as mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977). 
A growing need for patents for the purposes of retaliation and bargaining arises when 
other intellectual property holders increasingly enforce their own patents against the focal 
firm (Grindley and Teece, 1997). In that case, this firm would defensively file more patents 
itself in order to forearm against expropriation. A prominent example is the industry’s reac-
tion to Texas Instruments patent enforcement. Facing severe income problems in the mid-
1980s, the firm took a more aggressive stance toward intellectual property licensing in 1986, 
which, in turn, entailed increased patenting in the industry overall (Grindley and Teece, 1997; 
Hall and Ziedonis 2001).
5 
Increasing opposition rates may also create incentives to pursue a multiple-patents strat-
egy (cf. Harhoff and Hall, 2002; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). Since preparing an opposition 
                                                 
5  Hall and Ziedonis (2001, p. 109) quote from their interviews: “Indeed, interviewees were well aware of the 
strategies that Texas Instruments had put in place to manage—and profit from—its patent portfolio; represen-
tatives from several firms plan to adopt a similarly aggressive licensing strategy once their portfolios grow lar-
ger”. 9 
proceeding is far more labor-intensive than filing a patent, firms can mitigate the risk of los-
ing patents through opposition by filing more patents on the same invention. The adoption of 
such strategies, likely triggered when a firm has suffered the loss of some patents through 
opposition, leads to an increase in patenting without additional innovation or even invention.  
Similarly, if a firm starts to put more emphasis on royalty income from patents, it has in-
centives to increase its patenting. Since it is more difficult to invent around a larger patent 
portfolio, patenting increases the odds of receiving royalties. Such an increased focus on roy-
alty income and thus on patenting may even have been triggered by the management literature 
(e.g. Reitzig, 2004a, 2007; Rivette and Kline, 2000a, b). An example is provided by Rubin-
feld and Maness (2005) in their analysis of the personal watercraft industry where Yamaha 
uses its patents to raise its competitors’ cost—which can fiercely hit a competitor when mar-
gins in the product market are thin. 
A further important aspect of our discussion is the stance that a firm’s managers have to-
ward the signaling function of patents. If the management board adopts the view that high 
numbers of patent applications signal technology leadership to investors or customers, this 
firm would, ceteris paribus, start filing more patents than an otherwise comparable firm. Such 
a firm has “[…] an incentive to produce the indicator rather than what it is supposed to indi-
cate” (Macdonald 2001, 2004, p. 145). The usage of patents to improve a firm’s reputation 
has been empirically shown by Blind et al. (2006) and, with a focus on venture capital financ-
ing, by Haeussler et al. (2009) and Hsu and Ziedonis (2008). 
Finally, changes in patenting standards and other system level factors will influence patent 
propensity. Hall (2005) discusses whether major changes in the U.S. patent system, such as 
the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have led to increases in the pro-
pensity to patent. The grant policies of patent offices may have also influenced this increase. 
It is a trivial but realistic assumption that a firm realizes at some point that minor inventions, 
such as new combinations or applications of state-of-the-art technology or new subject-matter 10 
(e.g. software or business models), which would not have been patentable before, can success-
fully be pushed through the patenting process. It may adopt this practice and henceforth in-
creasingly patent (minor) inventions of this kind (Merges, 1999). This is in line with Wagner 
(2008) who finds evidence that the European Patent Office (EPO), albeit prohibited by the 
European Patent Convention (Article 52(2)), has granted patents on business methods. Further 
support is presented by Bessen and Hunt (2004) who trace a strong increase in patenting of 
software without increase in R&D input to non-software firms. 
3  Method and data 
To the best of our knowledge no evidence on the detailed mechanics of patent arms races 
in low-IP fragmentation markets exists. Thus, we chose exploratory and qualitative methods 
for this study. The subject of our analysis is the newspaper printing machines industry, which 
allows for an in-depth analysis of a stable set of very few players. Analyzing all four of the 
relevant firms, we are able to include almost 90 percent of the industry’s market share into our 
study.  
Since the goal of this paper is to contribute to the theory on motives to patent, case study 
research is the appropriate methodological approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The 
power of qualitative research methods in this context has been demonstrated by Hall and Zie-
donis (2001), who use field interviews, among other methods, to explore the essential me-
chanics of patent arms races in the semiconductor industry. Following Eisenhardt (1989) and 
Yin (2003, p. 14), we proceed by methodological triangulation. Our case study is based on 
patent data, document analysis, and interviews.  
First, we use data from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) and patent 
process information from the International Patent Documentation Center (INPADOC) be-11 
tween 1992 and 2006
6 in order to identify and analyze the development of patent portfolios in 
the industry. Second, we interpret these findings in light of 23 interviews and an analysis of 
press articles (e.g. from LexisNexis), financial data (e.g. from Compustat and Thom-
son/Reuters), and annual reports of printing press manufacturers. To this end, we conducted 
eight in-depth interviews with patent and R&D executives of printing machine manufacturers. 
We asked our interviewees about patenting related trends in their industry as well as about 
their own and their competitors’ patenting behaviors. These interviews were complemented 
by intensive email exchanges and follow-up interviews, allowing us to ask clarifying ques-
tions and to obtain feedback on earlier drafts of the paper. Two further interviews were con-
ducted with one patent examiner at the EPO and with one specialist from the printing depart-
ment at the German Engineering Federation (VDMA).
7 One interview was conducted with the 
chief technology officer (CTO) of a newspaper publishing company, i.e. a firm that buys and 
operates newspaper printing machines. The above interviews had an average duration of 45 
minutes and were recorded and transcribed. We conducted 12 further interviews that could 
not be recorded due to reasons of confidentiality, with an average duration of 30 minutes. 
During these interviews handwritten notes were taken. The interviewees comprised three 
other CTOs of newspaper printing houses and nine industry experts interviewed at the 
DRUPA 2008 printing trade fair in June 2008.
8 The latter were product managers, R&D engi-
neers, sales managers, or executives of manufacturers of printing machines. The analysis of 
all documented material follows the approach of qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2004) 
and was performed using the NVivo 8 software package. 
                                                 
6  We use an April 2009 version of PATSTAT. This version includes patent applications published until early 
2009. Since there is a delay of 18 months before a patent application is made public, the first full year of ob-
servation is 2006.  
7  VDMA stands for “Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau” (in English: German Engineering Fed-
eration). It is the largest engineering industry network in Europe. http://www.vdma.org/ (accessed 18 May 
2010). 
8  DRUPA stands for “Druck und Papier” (in English: Print and Paper). It is the world’s largest trade fair in the 
printing industry. http://www.drupa.de/ (accessed 18 May 2010). 12 
4  Results 
In Section 2, we suggested that the newspaper printing machines industry provides a good 
setting to analyze reasons of patent portfolio races apart from the fragmentation of ownership 
of intellectual property. Next, we sketch the structure of markets for technology in this sector 
and analyze patenting between 1992 and 2006. We then identify those players in the industry 
that directly reacted to the first mover and exclude alternative explanations of the sharp in-
crease in patenting that we observe. We compare patent portfolios in more detail, and investi-
gate what motives caused the increase in patenting by the first mover. Finally, we analyze by 
what measures the focal firms concretely effectuated their patent portfolio increases, and dis-
cuss timing and trigger events. 
4.1. Patenting and market structure in the newspaper printing machines sector 
4.1.1.  Market structure and competition 
The market for newspaper printing machines is a highly concentrated oligopoly, with the 
four largest firms accounting for nearly 90 percent of sales.
9 Since its emergence in the late 
nineteenth century, the industry has undergone a process of consolidation and is today domi-
nated by four major manufacturers. These four players comprise the two largest ones, Manro-
land AG and Koenig & Bauer AG (both headquartered in Germany; market share of 28 per-
cent each), as well as Goss International Inc. (United States; market share of 18 percent) and 
WIFAG Maschinenfabrik AG (Switzerland; market share of 13 percent). Almost 70 percent 
of the worldwide market is dominated by the firms headquartered in Europe. And even Goss, 
although headquartered in the United States, performs a significant share of manufacturing 
                                                 
9 Worldwide market volume in 2007 is estimated at EUR 1.0 - 1.2 billion with the following market shares: 
Koenig & Bauer: 28 %; Manroland: 28 %; Goss: 18 %; WIFAG: 13 %; Source: KBA: http://www.kba-
print.de/Filestore.aspx/aktuelle_kba-pr%C3%A4sentation.pdf?pool=kba&type=file&key=eea40870-d11c-
49c6-901e-221137189c41&lang=en&filetype=pdf&index=true (accessed 18 May 2010). 13 
and development in Europe.
10 This high market concentration makes Europe the most central 
market for newspaper printing technology. For that reason—and for the sake of clarity—the 
starting point of our analysis is constituted by patent applications at the EPO. 
Product market competition is most intense between Koenig & Bauer AG (KBA hereinaf-
ter), Manroland, and WIFAG, leading to price pressure and fierce fights for market shares. 
“Ruinous price competition” is often emphasized by executives as one of the key challenges 
to the industry (Steidle, 2003). For Goss, the firm’s focus on small format machines reduces 
its rivalry vis-à-vis the European firms. 
4.1.2.  Low fragmentation of patent ownership 
The newspaper printing machines industry is characterized by a very low fragmentation of 
patent ownership. This is to a large degree a consequence of the high concentration of the 
market in general. It is supported by high specificity of products (newspaper printing ma-
chines, or parts thereof, are unlikely to be used by firms other than newspaper publishing 
houses) and high vertical integration of manufacturers (for example, Manroland even operates 
its own steel foundry)
11. This increases the likelihood that relevant patents are held by manu-
facturers, instead of multiple suppliers or industry outsiders. As a consequence, firms in this 
industry should be able to identify dangerous patents by observing their competitors patenting 
activity. The observability of patents has been confirmed in our interviews:
 12   
(a) “If there were no patents, firms would no longer know what their competitors are develop-
ing”. 
 We conclude that relevant patents are observable and to a large degree held by industry 
incumbents. Referring to the market for “rotary printing presses” (a technical term for news-
                                                 
10 http://www.gossinternational.com/ (accessed 18 May 2010). 
11 http://www.manroland.com/com/en/Products_Services_Manufacturing_Services_Foundry_patternmaking.htm 
(accessed 18 May 2010). 
12 Quotes in German were translated into English by the authors.  14 
paper printing machines), one of our interviewees, supported by others, summarized the situa-
tion as follows:  
(b) “[…] in the patent landscape of printing machines, particularly rotary printing presses, no 
fragmentation takes place. Rather, there are always the same market players who file patents 
or try to enforce granted property rights against competitors”. 
4.1.3.  Patenting activity 
Giving a first quantitative indication of the patent arms race we study, Fig. 1 shows num-
bers of EPO patent applications of all four firms in the industry between 1992 and 2006. The 
diagram contains only applications pertaining to newspaper printing machines.
13  
--- Insert Fig. 1 here --- 
Fig. 1 reveals a striking pattern. Before 1999, patenting by all four firms is on a stable 
level with only minor fluctuations. During the period between 1999 and 2002, we observe a 
dramatic increase in patenting by KBA. After 2002 patenting by KBA seems to level off, 
however at a level almost four times higher than during the pre-1999 period (and decreases in 
2006, a point we will address in Section 4.3). We observe a subsequent increase, by a factor 
of 2.6, in Manroland’s filings between 2004 and 2005. If Manroland’s increase is indeed a 
reaction to KBA’s, the time lag between the two events is not surprising. Since patent applica-
tions are not published until 18 months after the filing date, there is a natural lag between an 
                                                 
13 Both KBA and Manroland also produce printing machines unrelated to newspaper production. We excluded 
the respective patent applications from our analysis. Since the International Patent Classification system does 
not separate newspaper printing machines from other printing machines (most patents are classified in B41F, 
“printing machines or presses”), we employed an algorithm based on geographical matching. We used the 
postal code of each first inventor indicated on a patent application and matched it to the companies’ sites. 
Since for both companies facilities related to newspaper printing machines are at different and geographically 
distant locations than those related to other products, we can use this method to exclude nonrelevant patents. 
Less than 5 percent of the patent applications classified as relevant by this method have a second or further in-
ventor from a facility related to other products, so that our classification should be correct in nearly all cases. 
In the case of WIFAG and Goss, we included all patent applications because both firms build exclusively ro-
tary printing machines. 
 15 
actual increase in patenting and it being observed by competitors. Whereas no increase is ob-
served in the case of WIFAG, Goss shows a strong increase in patenting after 2003 as well. 
4.2. Arms race versus alternative explanations 
The marked increases in patenting by KBA after 1999, Goss after 2003, and Manroland 
after 2004 that we observe in Fig. 1 suggest an interpretation as a patent portfolio race. That 
is, we conjecture that Manroland’s and Goss’s increase in patenting was caused and triggered 
by KBA’s (and possibly Goss’s also by Manroland’s). To support this conjecture, we dis-
cuss—and exclude—potential alternative explanations in the following. We start with Manro-
land and KBA, Goss and WIFAG follow. 
4.2.1.  Manroland and KBA 
Evidence from our interviews clearly corroborates the patent portfolio race hypothesis in 
the case of Manroland and KBA, and in particular the conjecture that Manroland’s increase in 
patenting was a reaction to KBA’s. As one interviewee put it: 
(c) „ […] a typical arms race occurred. One party dashes away, starts threatening you, you 
feel threatened, you get hit, then you follow. Finally you stand vis-à-vis bristling with weapons 
and then both parties realize: no one can really act without the other […]”. 
We now discuss and exclude a number of alternative explanations. To start with, analysis 
of data from Thomson/Reuters and from our interviews reveals that no major merger and ac-
quisition (M&A) activities took place during the phases of explosive patenting growth of 
KBA and Manroland that would explain the increase.
14 
Second, growth with the average can be excluded. The dramatic increases in KBA’s and 
Manroland’s application numbers are far above average growth rates (about 3.7 percent at the 
                                                 
14 For KBA, a minor acquisition took place in 2001 (De La Rue Giori SA), which is unrelated to newspaper 
printing. In the case of Manroland, three small firms were acquired after 2001, which had filed no patent ap-
plications before the acquisition. 16 
EPO)
15. Also, patenting by Manroland and KBA increased sharply and ad hoc rather than con-
tinuously.  
Third, we can exclude that increases in R&D inputs play a significant role in explaining 
the observed surge in patenting. Interviewees dismissed this explanation, and also data on 
R&D expenses from annual reports, while incomplete, show no increases that would explain 
the more than doubling of patenting by both firms.
16 Even more striking evidence is provided 
by R&D headcount numbers ( 
Table 1). In the case of KBA, we observe a slight increase in R&D headcount between 
1998 and 2002 (by 155 employees or 21 percent), but by far not a quadrupling. The pattern is 
even more striking for Manroland: while patenting increased more than three-fold between 
2002 and 2005, R&D headcount decreased steadily between 2001 and 2004, (by 282 employ-
ees or 24 percent). 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
Fourth, in order to evaluate a potential increase in innovative output, we analyzed product 
portfolios of Manroland and KBA. The search does not reveal tremendously more new prod-
uct introductions during the periods of the patenting explosion. In the case of KBA, new prod-
uct variations such as the Commander 6/2® and Commander CT® and automation modules 
such as RollerTronic®, NipTronic®, and PlateTronic® were introduced, which certainly ac-
count for some of the additional patent applications. Yet, they are not major enough that they 
could independently underlie the quadrupling in the number of KBA’s patent applications. 
These findings are supported by interview evidence. Since responses by manufacturing firm 
representatives would likely be biased, we asked users of newspaper printing machines. None 
                                                 
15 Between 1982 and 2002; cf. EPO (2007: 36). 
16 Data was taken from the full text of annual reports since most of the companies do not report R&D expenses 
in the income statement. 17 
of the four interviewees saw any relation between the respective manufacturers’ innovative-
ness and the number of their patent filings. In fact, WIFAG, the firm with the lowest number 
of patent applications in the sample, is perceived at least as equally innovative as KBA, Man-
roland, and Goss. The CTO of a large German newspaper publisher put it as follows: 
(d) “[…] from my perspective all of them are very active in patenting, but none of them had a 
real blockbuster product. […] I would say WIFAG was the most innovative firm in the past 
[…]”. 
Fifth and finally, collusive behavior might provide a potential explanation. It would be 
present if KBA and Manroland had jointly increased their patenting in order to erect market 
entry barriers for new entrants or to squeeze out other incumbents such as WIFAG. Our inter-
viewees acknowledged that blocked market entry and increased pressure on third parties 
might be side effects of the portfolio race. However, they made clear that it was not the mo-
tive to initiate or join the race. One interviewee commented: 
(e) “At the end it might be that you don’t win against your strongest enemy, but against the 
rest of the world. We have thought of this outcome, […] but we do not observe that it is hap-
pening”.  
Incumbents not involved in the race supported this view. The interviewees did not per-
ceive KBA’s and Manroland’s increase in patenting as a joint strike against them, but rather 
as a fight between the two market leaders. Furthermore, all interviewees saw product com-
plexity as a better entry barrier than patents. 
4.2.2.  Goss 
Whereas in the case of Manroland and KBA we have clear evidence of a patent portfolio 
race, Goss’s patent portfolio grew independently. Goss’s patenting increase since 2004 is due 
to a major acquisition of a business line from Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG in 2004. An 
analysis of Goss’s patent applications reveals that 83 percent of the applications filed after 18 
2003 originated from business units that were part of that transaction.
17 Thus, there is conclu-
sive evidence that the increase in Goss’s patenting is due to the expansion of the firm rather 
than to “strategic” patenting. It is plausible that Goss did not react directly to KBA’s and 
Manroland’s patent race since competition is much more intense between KBA and Manro-
land than between the latter two and Goss, the major reason being Goss’s stronger focus on 
small-format machines and less focus on the European market. This interpretation is sup-
ported by our interviews. 
4.2.3.  WIFAG 
In the case of WIFAG, no increase in patenting is observed. This is due to WIFAG’s less 
aggressive intellectual property policy, which relies on securing freedom to operate through 
“prior use” defense rather than through growing the patent portfolio. This strategy appears 
sensible since WIFAG, due to its smaller size (around 1,400 employees, of those around 200 
in engineering)
18, would likely not be able to compete in a patent arms race with its far bigger 
competitors Manroland and KBA (both more than 8,000 employees; more than 800 in R&D, 
cf. Table 1).  
The previous paragraphs show that, whereas the patenting increase by Goss was due to 
M&A activity and WIFAG showed no increase at all, patenting by Manroland and KBA grew 
to a large extent independently of the firms’ size, inputs to R&D, and innovative output, nor 
was it the result of collusive behavior. Having excluded all possible alternative explanations 
we can think of, we thus conclude that between the two industry leaders indeed a patent port-
folio race took place. For this reason, our subsequent patent analysis concentrates on Manro-
land and KBA. 
                                                 
17 E.g. facilities located in Dover (NH, USA), Boxmeer (Netherlands), or Montataire (France). Goss acquired the 
web-fed offset business of Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG in 2004. http://www.heidelberg.com/www/html/ 
en/content/articles/investor/reports-figures-news/news/2004/170604_goss_international?msgId=45348258805 
38 (accessed 18 May 2010). 
18 See corporate Web site: http://www.wifag.ch/cmse/index.php?id=43,0,0,1,0,0 (accessed 18 May 2010). 19 
4.3. KBA’s and Manroland’s patent portfolios 
We now analyze Manroland’s and KBA’s patenting in more detail. As they share a com-
mon home market, Germany, we include patent applications at the German Patent and 
Trademark Office (GPTO) to our further analysis. In addition, we include patent stocks. We 
extracted grant dates of patent applications from our database and the dates of expiration for 
granted patents (either through nonpayment of renewal fees, withdrawal, or 20 years after 
filing). Using this information, we calculated the stock of granted, “active” patents in its port-
folio for each firm. Since we are primarily interested in the bilateral relation of the two firms, 
we limit the analysis to patents valid in Germany. That is, we include patent applications filed 
at and granted by the EPO that indicate Germany as a designated state of protection (Fig. 2), 
and patent applications that were filed directly at and granted by the GPTO (Fig. 3). We fur-
ther take into account patents that were acquired through M&A activity.
19   
Fig. 2 reveals an interesting pattern. Whereas Manroland has a rather stable portfolio of 
patents obtained through the EPO patenting process, KBA seems to have pursued a much 
more aggressive policy. KBA’s dramatic increase in patenting after 1999 leads to a strong 
growth in its patent portfolio in the subsequent years. While KBA held fewer EPO-granted 
German patents than Manroland in 1997, its portfolio of such patents is almost three times as 
large as Manroland’s in 2005. Manroland, in contrast, holds a portfolio of rather constant size, 
with around 140 EPO-granted German patents during the period between 2000 and 2006. Due 
to grant lag, we do not yet observe the impact of Manroland’s more than doubling of EPO 
patent applications. 
--- Insert Fig. 2 here --- 
                                                 
19 In the case of KBA the acquisition of Albert-Frankenthal AG in 1988 was taken into account. In the case of 
Manroland, patents of Roland Offsetmaschinenfabrik, which created Manroland through a merger in 1979, are 
taken into account.  20 
In Fig. 3, we present the results of an analogous analysis of patent applications filed di-
rectly at the GPTO. This diagram shows very clearly when industry incumbents abandoned 
their strategy of stable patent portfolios. While both firms’ portfolios had a stable size of 
around 150 patents between 1992 and 2001, KBA’s hike in patent application numbers, from 
39 in 1999 to 105 in 2000, leads to a continuous growth of its portfolio in the subsequent 
years. In 2006, it is more than twice as high as in 2000. A reaction by Manroland is observed 
in 2004, with patenting rates more than tripling from 26 in 2003 to 91 in 2004. We observe 
the beginning of an increase in portfolio size in 2005. 
--- Insert Fig. 3 here --- 
It is noteworthy that Manroland’s first reaction is stronger at the GPTO (65 more applica-
tions in 2004 than in 2003, up from 26) than at the EPO (30 more applications in 2005 than 
2004, up from 18). Patent applications being less costly at the GPTO makes it is easier to ef-
fectuate a strong increase nationally. At the same time, GPTO patents are equally effective as 
EPO-granted patents in the bilateral relationship of Manroland and KBA, since both firms 
manufacture in Germany and patents can also be used to forbid production of infringing 
goods. The further increase in GPTO patenting (by 33 percent) by KBA in 2006 can be ex-
plained similarly. If patents are primarily used in the bilateral relationship, it is sensible to 
react to Manroland’s increase by increasing patenting at the GPTO, a fact that would also 
explain the decrease in KBA’s EPO patenting in 2006 (Figure 2). Since EPO patenting is 
costly and KBA’s application rates have been about three times as high as Manroland’s in the 
past, it is plausible that KBA substituted some of its EPO patent applications for equally ef-
fective, less costly GPTO patent applications. 21 
4.4. Why KBA increased patenting 
Having established that KBA and Manroland are in a patent portfolio race, we now ana-
lyze the drivers that induced KBA to start the race.  
4.4.1.  Perceived ineffectiveness of patents  
Whereas patents play a less important role than product complexity for the protection of a 
whole printing machine against imitation through third parties or new entrants, they are nec-
essary to protect product features and subsystems from being imitated by competitors. It is 
unlikely that competitors, having their own established product lines, would imitate a whole 
printing machine. Yet, there is a high risk that they would imitate improvements or new sub-
systems. According to our interviews, the belief that single patents are not effective to prevent 
such imitation evolved at KBA toward the end of the 1990s. 
There are two major reasons underlying this view. The first is that inventing around a sin-
gle patent is relatively easy for a competitor with comparable know-how. The second is that 
significant numbers of patent grants received by KBA were opposed. One interviewee esti-
mated the rate of oppositions against KBA patents to be 20 percent, which is around three 
times as high as the average.
20  
This perceived weakness of single patents induced KBA to introduce a new protection 
strategy. The new strategy mainly consists of filing more patents per product, e.g. through 
patenting inventions that would not have been patented before or patenting different layouts 
of the same invention. This strategy serves to build up patent fences (cf. Granstrand, 1999), 
section 2.2) in order to mitigate the risks from invent-around and opposition. Using an anal-
ogy from navigation, one interviewee summarized KBA’s strategy change: 
                                                 
20 Wagner (2008) finds that 6.49 percent of all granted EPO patents are opposed. Harhoff et al. (2003) find that 
8.7 percent of all granted GPTO patents are opposed. 22 
(f) “Me, too, I’d rather have ten small barriers in the water than a single big one; because the 
latter is easy to circumnavigate”. 
The impact of low perceived patent effectiveness on patenting strategy that we observe 
here is in line with findings by Cohen et al. (2000: 25, emphasis added), who state that 
“[f]irms do not, however, build such patent fences because individual patents effectively pre-
vent imitation or substitution, but because they do not”. 
4.4.2.  Patents as signals  
Our interviews clearly show that the usage of patents as signals of technology leadership 
and innovativeness is not a major reason behind the increase. Yet, firms tend to also exploit 
their high patenting rates in this way. It seems to be common for both firms to report in-
creased patenting numbers in annual reports or press releases, and claim technology leader-
ship based on these numbers.
21 
4.4.3.  Patent enforcement and licensing  
We observe very few patent infringement conflicts on the court level.
22 However, qualita-
tive evidence from interviews suggests that licensing in the industry has grown over the last 
years, and that behind-the-scenes enforcement is intensive. Using an analogy from soccer, 
where a yellow card constitutes a reprimand by the referee, one interviewee stated: 
(g) “Almost every day we show each other the yellow card. Manroland, KBA, WIFAG—day-
to-day it is the same discussion”. 
                                                 
21 See, e.g. http://www.kba-print.de/de/investor/berichte/06.html or 
http://www.manroland.com/com/en/press_releases_company_3163.htm (accessed 18 May 2010). 
22 We used the LexisNexis database for a systematic search of reports on such conflicts. Further, we inquired 
about such conflicts at German district courts. Finally, all interviewees were asked whether they knew about 
court-level conflicts. 23 
In such a situation, patents fulfill an important function as “bargaining chips”. Such strategic 
use of patents creates an incentive to grow patent portfolios in order to improve one’s bargain-
ing position, and finally reinforces the patent portfolio race that we observe. 
4.5. Effectuating rapid increases in patenting 
An important question to be resolved is how the firms in our sample were able to effectu-
ate such dramatic increases in patenting over such a short period of time. We identify the pat-
enting of previously unpatented inventions, the filing of more patents per invention, and com-
binatorial patent applications as major drivers. 
First, patents were filed on inventions that would not have been deemed worth patenting 
some years ago. Thus, part of the increase in patenting is attributable to minor inventions. 
Commenting on why his firm did not increase patenting earlier, an interviewee stated: 
(h) “It was somewhat depending on the self-conception of the engineers who did not file [pat-
ent applications for] each bagatelle that you have developed, reconfigured or implemented”. 
Another interviewee stated that it has become common to file rather trivial patents:  
(i) “Today, if they draw a line on a paper, they would patent it”.
  
Second, patents were filed on different versions or layouts of the same invention, creating 
so-called “patent fences” (Granstrand, 1999). In addition, inventions were protected by multi-
ple “smaller” patents rather than one “big” patent. Such dual strategy of “more patented in-
ventions” and “more patents per invention” is the central driver of the strong increase in pat-
enting that we observe.  
Concrete examples of the functioning of this strategy are “divisional applications”. Euro-
pean patent law allows applicants to split up one patent application into two or more applica-
tions as long as subject matter is not extended (Article 76 European Patent Convention). Simi-
lar procedures are available at the GPTO (§39 PatG, German Patent Code) and the United 24 
States Patent and Trademark Office. We find that divisional applications were often used to 
establish dense networks of smaller patents covering various features of the initial, sometimes 
very voluminous, application. For example, the application EP1233864 led to 10 divisional 
applications. A closer analysis reveals that out of KBA’s European patent applications in 
2002, 32 percent resulted from splitting up other patent applications (as opposed to 6 percent 
in 1992). For comparison, divisional applications currently make up around 5 percent of all 
European patent applications (EPO, 2009, p. 5).  
Third, the results of our interviews suggest that patents covering combinations of inven-
tions were filed. Given two inventions, one patent would be filed for each invention sepa-
rately, and a third one for a combination thereof. In some cases, it seems that even patents on 
new inventions in combination with state-of-the-art technology were filed. Printing cylinders 
seem to be an example. One important design change was an increase in the breadth of such 
cylinders at the end of the 1990s. Whereas the new format did not change the technical mode 
of operation of printing machines in principle, existing components (such as drive systems) 
underwent adaptations. While many engineers believed that those two elements (the broader 
printing cylinder and the modified drive system) were not inventive enough to be patentable 
(see quote (h) above), KBA succeeded in securing patents on the combination of the two ele-
ments. Combining the broader printing cylinder with existing components, they were even 
able to build a thicket of patent rights covering the new cylinder format—which in the mean-
time was used by other firms as well. This approach put KBA—at least temporarily—into a 
powerful position toward its competitors. One interviewee commented on the effects of 
KBA’s strategy: 
(j) “[…] as a consequence, this was often hindering to us, since they simply blocked a product 
line which we are also active in, with patent applications first, and then to an increasing de-
gree with a multitude of patents”
 . 25 
The situation that the interviewee describes effectively amounts to holdup. Since these pa-
tents partially cover technology that firms have already made investments in, inventing 
around may be very costly. These costs rise further since the alleged infringer would not only 
have to invent around a single patent, but a multitude of them—a patent fence. This fact al-
lows the patent holder to extract rents from other firms, either through licensing or indirectly 
by creating higher costs for competitors. 
In addition, we find examples where new inventions were not only combined with other 
technology, but with known machine parameters such as temperature. For example, in a pat-
ent application on a new mode of utilization of printing ink (patent number EP1446290) the 
minimum temperature of 30°C of the plate cylinder of a printing machine was added to the 
claims. Interviewed engineers told us that 30°C is somewhat the standard operating tempera-
ture of such cylinders. However, this is common knowledge rather than documented informa-
tion, and was thus not identified by the patent examiner as belonging to the state of the art.  
This patent application was opposed after grant, with the outcome of the opposition still 
pending. But even if the patent is revoked, the opponent will be worse off than the applicant 
due to the period of uncertainty and the cost of opposing a patent. One interviewee estimated 
that preparing an opposition or appeal
23 takes one man-week, whereas filing a patent takes 
only one man-day. Filing more than one patent application on an invention multiplies the cost 
of opposition and allows diversification of opposition risk. Actually, the above–mentioned 
temperature patent has three European divisional applications.  
4.6. Timing and trigger events 
Having established the reasons for the increase in patenting, we turn our attention to the 
question of why it happened in 2000 in the case of KBA, and around 2004 for Manroland.  
                                                 
23 An appeal aims at invalidating granted patents after expiry of the nine-month opposition period.  26 
In the case of Manroland, we know that the increase in patenting is firstly due to the perceived 
threat from KBA’s growing patent portfolio. Second, it is due to concrete, holdup-like threats 
from some particularly dangerous groups of patents, such as the above-mentioned patent 
fence around the new cylinder format. The lag between the increase of KBA’s and Manro-
land’s filing numbers can be explained by the 18-month publication lag and the time it took 
Manroland to prepare its reaction. We would also assume a further year to lapse until Manro-
land realized that the increase is sustainable and not a singular “outlier”. 
In the case of KBA, the major trigger was the development of new product features and 
versions. While these inventions by themselves did not warrant a strong increase in patent-
ing—let alone a tripling of application numbers—they offered a good opportunity to establish 
the new strategy of building patent fences around them. Among them were new product varia-
tions (see Section 4.2.1) such as Commander 6/2®, a printing machine based on the above-
mentioned larger printing cylinder format. 
Finally, we have anecdotal evidence that the printing industry’s most important trade fair, 
the DRUPA, which is held every four years in Düsseldorf (Germany), might trigger patenting. 
Industry incumbents tend to file more patents before the trade fair takes place. The rationale is 
that the exhibition of innovations at a trade fair reveals inventions to the public, which may 
preclude future patenting. So, it may not be incidental that the sharp patenting increases of 
KBA in 2000 and Manroland in 2004 fall in years when the DRUPA was held. After these 
respective years, however, both firms kept their elevated patenting level. 
5  Discussion 
5.1. Summary 
Given the scarcity of existing research and the high degree of concentration of the market 
under study, we employed case study methods. Starting from a patent data analysis we in-27 
clude qualitative evidence from press articles and other documented sources, and use inter-
views to enrich and interpret our findings. 
What we observe is a patent arms race in the printing machines oligopoly—an industry 
that existing theory would have predicted to be immune to such development due to its high 
concentration of intellectual property ownership. We can exclude higher innovative output, 
increased inputs to R&D, growth with the average, major M&As, and collusive behavior as 
significant drivers of the patenting increase. Rather, it was driven by a patent strategy change 
of the first mover from filing individual patents to building patent fences and thickets, moti-
vated by the perceived invectiveness of individual patents. The patenting increase by the sec-
ond firm was clearly a reaction to the first firm. It was motivated by the perceived threat 
through the competitor’s larger patent portfolio, and by concrete holdup-like situations. The 
latter finding is particularly interesting since we would have expected holdup risk to be less 
present in a highly concentrated market. Yet, we find that through sophisticated filing strate-
gies, and presumably shortcomings of the examination process, firms are able to create such 
situations. 
We thus contribute to the theory on motives to patent by showing that, while literature 
predicts that high dispersion of patent ownership and high industry dynamicity are the major 
drivers of patent portfolio races, the absence of these drivers does not prevent strong and swift 
increases in patenting. Even under highly concentrated patent ownership and product life cy-
cles of 10 to 20 years, a more than tripling of patent applications numbers within only three 
years was observed.  
5.2. Welfare implications 
The welfare implications of a patent arms race are unfavorable. While the increase in pat-
enting may have yielded temporary advantages for the first mover, in the long run a patent 
arms race reduces efficiency for all parties involved. In this vein, Cohen et al. (2000, p. 28, 28 
emphasis added) critically note that “[…] patent portfolio races […] reflect excessive patent-
ing from a social welfare perspective (as would typify a [p]risoners' [d]ilemma-like situa-
tion), and are thus raising the cost of innovation unduly”. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2007, p. 81) characterize excessive use of patents as a zero- or negative-sum game and Jaffe 
(2000) argues that at the end, none of the firms increases its returns to innovation. In fact, 
innovation might even be hampered if engineers dedicate time to reading, writing, and enforc-
ing patents at the expense of inventing and constructing new products.  
Structurally, a patent arms race is similar to a price war. According to the folk theorem in 
game theory (e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 246), in an oligopoly any pricing level within a certain 
range is sustainable as the equilibrium of a repeated pricing game. Unilateral deviation from 
this equilibrium yields short-term advantages for the deviating firm, but would trigger retalia-
tion strategies that could bring down the entire industry to a new equilibrium with reduced 
prices and profits. A patent arms race is even more precarious than a price war, for two rea-
sons. First, the 18-month publication lag restricts observability of competitors’ actions, which 
makes a unilateral breach of an implicit collusion (i.e. low levels of patenting) more attractive 
(e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 248). Second, while price wars may be welfare enhancing overall since 
they benefit buyers, excessive patenting constitutes wasteful expenditures from a societal 
point of view.  
5.3. Possible long-term outcomes 
Possible long-term outcomes of a patent arms race are a cooperative contractual solution, 
an outright patent war, and a leveling-off at higher patenting rates. As to contractual solutions 
to resolve mutual blocking with patents, patent pools and cross-licenses are common in the 
semiconductor and electronics industry (Shapiro, 2001). In a highly concentrated industry, 
however, patent pools would likely create antitrust issues. A limited cross-license would 
avoid antitrust problems, but would have to be renegotiated after a certain period and would, 29 
thus, not solve the problem. Since balancing payments are typically negotiated on the basis of 
patent counts, they create incentives for further patenting. 
An outright patent war would be the most aggressive outcome, with juridical assertion of 
all conflicting patents and steadily growing patent portfolios. Such a situation, which would 
nearly amount to a mutual destruction of the opponents, is not observed in our study. This is 
in line with the folk theorem, according to which an equilibrium outcome is more stable the 
lower the temporary advantages from unilateral deviation (e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 248). Since the 
benefit-cost ratio of a unilateral increase in patenting will become more unfavorable the 
higher the current patenting rates, one would expect a “truce” at some elevated level of pat-
enting.  
Such leveling-off at higher patenting rates is indeed what we observe. Manroland’s man-
agers were aware of the prisoner’s dilemma-like situation, and felt forced into the arms race. 
They would likely not increase patenting further than necessary, i.e. until being on an eye 
level with KBA. Manroland’s patenting at the GPTO indeed remained stable between 2004 
and 2006, equal to KBA’s prior level between 2000 and 2005. KBA, in turn, has not increased 
patenting since 2002 (but seems to have shifted some of its patenting activity from the EPO to 
the GPTO in 2006). Thus, it seems that some kind of “tacit collusion” evolved that helped 
avoid a further escalation. Even explicit coordination would theoretically have been possible 
(though we have no indication that it took place), since our interviews suggest that intellectual 
property and R&D executives of all involved firms know each other well and meet regularly. 
6  Conclusions 
Our study provides a number of insights for managers. It demonstrates how patent strate-
gies such as fencing work concretely. It analyzes what may cause a patenting increase by a 
competitor and what effects an increase of own patenting may have on others. Further, our 
article suggests that such patent strategies, while yielding temporary advantages for the first 30 
mover, are likely suboptimal in the long run. Managers should, thus, think twice before initi-
ating a patent portfolio race. 
On the policy level, our findings suggest that the patent system was fueling the arms race. 
The ability to obtain patents on minor inventions, combinations of state-of-the-art or machine 
parameters with new inventions, and the availability of divisional applications were central 
elements in the strong increase in patenting that we observed. These possibilities led many of 
our interviewees to perceive the patent offices’ grant policy as “lax”, in particular at the EPO 
(compared to the GPTO). Not surprisingly, firms’ perception of being able to obtain patents 
quite easily constitutes an additional incentive to file more patents. This finding implies, once 
more, that patent offices should consider raising the patentability threshold. Furthermore, it 
supports existing criticism that rising patent application numbers should not be celebrated as 
signs of increasing innovativeness, but rather should be closely scrutinized as indications of 
problems in the patent system. 
Our study has a number of limitations and suggests avenues for future research. First, 
since we focus on the machinery industry and identify differences to the semiconductor, elec-
tronics, and software industry, further studies on other industries such as pharmaceuticals or 
biotechnology are needed to draw a complete picture of causes and effects of patent portfolio 
races. 
Second, we could clearly show that the observed increases in patenting were not mainly 
driven by heightened inventive activity and that patenting rates are, within boundaries, some-
what arbitrary. However, we did not precisely identify what share of patent applications was 
attributable to the strategy of harvesting more patents from a given number of inventions. 
Thus, an avenue for future research would be to measure the extent of such strategies more 
precisely. Our analysis of divisional applications, combinatorial patents, and multiple filings 
constitutes a starting point to such analysis. Recent changes in European patent legislation to 31 
limit the abuse of divisional patent applications underline the need for action in this field.
24 
Further studies should be undertaken to supply policy makers with the relevant information. 
 
                                                 
24 Decision of the Administrative Council of 25 March 2009 amending the Implementing Regulations to the 
European Patent Convention (CA/D 2/09): http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/decisions/archive/20090325.html (accessed 18 May 2010). 32 
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 Fig. 1: Number of newspaper printing machines related patent applications at the EPO 






























































KBA - stock of German patents granted by EPO
Manroland - stock of German patents granted by EPO
KBA - patent applications at EPO
Manroland - patent applications at EPO
 
Fig. 2: Stock of active German newspaper printing patents (granted by the EPO) and 









































































KBA - stock of German patents granted by GPTO
Manroland - stock of German patents granted by GPTO
KBA - patent applications at GPTO
Manroland - patent applications at GPTO
 
Fig. 3: Stock of active German newspaper printing patents (granted by the GPTO) and 
patent applications (at the GPTO) 
 
 
Table 1: R&D headcount (source: annual reports of KBA and Manroland) 
Year: 1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
KBA:  --  735 775 802 866 890 --  --  --  800 
Man-
roland:  1200  1050 804  1126 1183 1096 1022 901  --  -- 
 
 